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Abstract: Discourse about smart algorithms and digital 
social agents still refers primarily to the construction of 
artificial intelligence that reproduces the faculties of indi-
viduals. Recent developments, however, show that algo-
rithms are more efficient when they abandon this goal and 
try instead to reproduce the ability to communicate. Algo-
rithms that do not “think” like people can affect the abili-
ty to obtain and process information in society. Referring 
to the concept of communication in Niklas Luhmann’s 
 theory of social systems, this paper critically reconstructs 
the debate on the computational turn of big data as the 
artificial reproduction not of intelligence but of communi-
cation. Self-learning algorithms parasitically take advan-
tage – be it consciously or unaware – of the contribution of 
web users to a “virtual double contingency.” This provides 
society with information that is not part of the thoughts 
of anyone, but, nevertheless, enters the communication 
circuit and raises its complexity. The concept of commu-
nication should be reconsidered to take account of these 
developments, including (or not) the possibility of com-
municating with algorithms.
Keywords: Social Algorithms; Big Data; Artificial Intelli-
gence; Neural Networks; Deep Learning; Double Contin-
gency; Systems Theory.
Zusammenfassung: Die Diskurse und Debatten über 
„smarte“ Algorithmen und digitale soziale Agenten bezie-
hen sich vorwiegend auf Konstruktionen künstlicher In-
telligenz, die die kognitiven Fähigkeiten von individuellen 
Akteuren nachbilden. Gegenwärtige Forschungen zeigen 
aber, dass solche Algorithmen erfolgreich sind, die nicht 
dieses Ziel verfolgen, sondern sich an den Kommunikati-
onsfähigkeiten von Akteuren orientieren. Algorithmen, 
die nicht die Fähigkeiten von Individuen nachbilden, kön-
nen die Möglichkeiten und Fähigkeiten der Prozessierens 
von Informationen verbessern. Unter Bezugnahme auf 
das Konzept der Kommunikation der Systemtheorie von 
Niklas Luhmann rekonstruiert der vorliegende Beitrag 
diesen Wandel in der künstlichen Intelligenz von Big Data 
als artifiziellen Reproduktionen von Kommunikation und 
nicht von Intelligenz. Selbstlernende Algorithmen machen 
sich den (reflektierten oder unreflektierten) Umgang von 
Nutzern im Umgang mit virtueller doppelter Kontingenz 
zu Diensten. Dies versorgt die Gesellschaft mit Informa-
tionen, die nicht auf individuellen Intelligenzen beruhen, 
sondern auf kommunikativen Kreisläufen, wodurch die 
kommunikative Komplexität gesteigert werden kann. Aus 
diesem Grunde und vor dem Hintergrund dieser Entwick-
lungen muss auch das Konzept der Kommunikation noch-
mals neu daraufhin untersucht werden, ob es Kommuni-
kation mit Algorithmen zu integrieren vermag oder nicht.
Schlüsselwörter: Soziale Algorithmen; Big Data; Künstli-
che Intelligenz; Neurale Netzwerke; Tiefgehendes Lernen; 
Doppelte Kontingenz; Systemtheorie.
1  A sociology of algorithms
Algorithms are social agents. Their presence and role are 
now central and indispensable in many sectors of soci-
ety, both as tools to do things (such as machines) and as 
communicative partners. Algorithms are involved in com-
munication not only on the web, where the active role of 
bots is now taken for granted, but also (explicitly or not) in 
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more traditional forms, such as print communication and 
even voice communication.
Precise estimates are difficult (Ferrara et al. 2016), but 
apparently in online communication, bots are the authors 
of approximately 50% of the traffic.1 Millions of Twitter 
users are bots,2 more than 70% of trading in Wall Street 
happens via automatic programs, at least 40% of Wikipedia 
editing is carried out by bots. Highly automated accounts 
generated close to 25% of all Twitter traffic about the 2016 
U.S. presidential debate (Kollany, Howard, and Woolley 
2016). That Google and Facebook are driven by algorithms 
is well known, with the paradoxical consequence that 
the “discovery” that human operators guide the selection 
of news in Facebook Trending Topics was perceived as a 
scandal (Gillespie 2016). Similar systems are also used in 
personalized communication: on Gmail, the Smart Reply 
app recognizes emails that need responses and generates 
perfectly adequate natural language answers on the fly.3 
Spotify’s most popular compilation, Discover Weekly, is en-
tirely assembled by an algorithm – as is Release Radar, the 
hyper-personalized playlist of new tracks (Pierce 2016b).
In these and many other cases web surfers communi-
cate by means of algorithms, and often this happens also 
when we read texts in the traditional form of newspaper 
articles or books. Companies like Narrative Science4 and 
Automated Insight5 have developed algorithms to produce 
texts that are indistinguishable from those written by a 
human author: newspaper articles, brochures for com-
mercial products, textbooks, and more. Philip Parker, pro-
fessor at INSEAD in Fontainebleau, patented a method to 
automatically produce perfectly plausible and informative 
books, including more than 100,000 titles already avail-
able on Amazon.com. Robo-journalism is regularly used 
by the Associated Press and many companies like Sam-
sung, Yahoo, Comcast, and others (Podolny 2015).
Even in voice communication, millions of individu-
als regularly interact with digital personal assistants like 
Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s Cortana, IBM’s 
Watson, or Google Now, using natural language interfaces 
to answer new questions, manage the calendar, and offer 
individual suggestions and recommendations. In many 
1 Global Bot Traffic Report 2015
2 According to the company itself, which provides its users with a 
tool, Twitteraudit, to calculate how many of their followers are “real” 
(meaning human beings). 
3 Cf. Google, at: https://gmail.googleblog.com/2015/11/computer- 
respond-to-this-email.html (accessed on November 30, 2015).
4 Cf. Narrative Science, at: https://www.narrativescience.com (ac-
cessed on May 25. 2016).
5 Cf. Automated Insight, at: https://automatedinsights.com (ac-
cessed on May 16. 216).
cases, these programs seem to know the users better than 
their human partners and often better than the users 
themselves (Youyou, Kosinski & Stillwell 2015), anticipat-
ing their needs and demands even before they emerge.
The communicative role of algorithms is clearly a mas-
sive social phenomenon with many complex consequenc-
es. What does sociology have to offer on this topic? Marres 
and Gerlitz (2017) criticize the social deficits of computa-
tional technology because in the discussion to understand 
these developments and to provide an interpretive frame-
work, the social sciences and sociology are curiously in a 
secondary position. Certainly there is a lot of sociological 
work on the social consequences of the spread of digiti-
zation, but it often follows developments that have taken 
place and have become well established without its con-
tribution. The social sciences are committed to identifying 
shortcomings and dangers of technology. In highlighting 
the ethical and political aspects of technology and its im-
pact on public opinion or social order, they focus on issues 
such as threats to privacy, risks of job loss, concentration 
of power in a few large corporations, intergenerational or 
international inequalities (the digital divide), and the ex-
ploitation of underpaid workers (Mechanical Turk) or even 
of all users (“If you are not paying for it, you’re not the 
customer; you’re the product being sold”).
Why social deficits? The topics covered by social sci-
ences are extremely relevant and their contribution very 
useful, but this does not exhaust the role that sociology 
could (and should) play in the development of digitization. 
The sociological perspective is not involved in designing 
algorithms, which are programmed without adequate 
consideration of social and communicative aspects. The 
dominant reference in digitalization is still to individuals, 
as in Artificial Intelligence (Nilsson 2010): here the goal is 
to artificially reproduce the abilities of human beings, pos-
sibly integrating cognitive skills with intentionality or with 
subconscious aspects identified by philosophical reflection 
(after Dreyfus 1972 or Searle 1980). In sociological perspec-
tive, however, the primary reference is not to individual 
psychological processes but to communication. After all, 
what is interesting in the interaction with algorithms is not 
what happens in the machine’s artificial brain, but what 
the machine tells its users and the consequences of this. 
The problem is not that the machine is able to think but 
that it is able to communicate. The reference to communi-
cation and social context is the central issue, which should 
primarily inform the programming of effective social algo-
rithms.6 Sociology is the discipline to deal with this.
6 Some isolated voices have called for this for decades, cf. Suchman 
1986; Collins 1990; the “socionics” project in Malsch 2001.
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This is especially urgent now, when algorithms mas-
sively and autonomously play a role in communication. 
With respect to reflection on intelligent machines in the 
1970s and 1980s many things have changed. First of all, 
computers are not isolated but always interconnected, 
and, furthermore, this connection occurs by means of 
the Web 2.0, which includes previously unthinkable data 
sources. The participatory web invites users to generate 
their own video, audio, and textual contents, which they 
share with other users in blogs, social media, wikis, and 
on countless media sites. This multiplicity of spontaneous 
and uncontrolled contents, with their metadata, adds to 
institutional content and to the data provided by pervasive 
sensors (the Internet of Things) to generate the increasing 
mass (or cloud) of data available in digital format.
Availability of data, however, is not enough. Excess 
of data has always been a difficulty. But recent program-
ming techniques are able to obtain and process data in 
ways that are vastly more efficient and can also turn into 
advantages the problems that until now have hindered 
the development of Artificial Intelligence projects, such 
as vagueness and messiness of data or the unpredictable 
variety of contexts. Self-learning algorithms are able to 
work efficiently with data that not only are very numerous 
and complex, but also lack a structure recognizable to and 
understandable for human logic. Hence the recent (and 
far from clear) discourse on Big Data (Crawford, Miltner 
& Gray 2014), which departs more and more clearly from 
models analogous to individual mental processes. Data 
are social in their origin, and the processes elaborating 
them are often incomprehensible to human observers.
To address these developments, I argue that we need 
an approach referring not to intelligence but directly to 
communication. This requires a powerful and flexible 
concept of communication, sufficiently independent of 
individual psychological processes and able to take into 
account the cases where the partner is not (or cannot be) a 
human being. Such a concept must refer to society, not to 
individuals or groups of individuals.7 I propose the theory 
of social systems in Niklas Luhmann’s formulation as an 
adequate framework, with sufficient complexity to deal 
with these issues  – although Luhmann himself did not 
work specifically on communication with algorithms. 
In my argumentation I will first present the alleged Big 
Data revolution, which I attribute to artificial reproduction 
not of intelligence but of communication. Recent “smart” 
algorithms, I will show, are efficient not because they have 
7 Marres and Gerlitz 2017 observe the need for a science of society 
as a consequence of the intensification of socio-technical infrastruc-
tures.
learned to work like human intelligence, but because they 
have abandoned the attempt and the ambition to do so 
and are oriented directly toward the forms of communi-
cation. I then reconstruct interaction with algorithms in 
terms of Luhmann’s theory, where the central point for the 
definition of communication is not the sharing of thoughts 
among participants but the presence of a situation of 
double contingency. From this perspective I reconstruct 
communication with a partner who does not think, i.e. a 
machine or any device capable of producing surprising in-
formation, and introduce the notion of virtual contingency 
to describe the situation in which a communication part-
ner is confronted with his or her own contingency, revised 
and reflected in such a way as to simulate the conditions 
of communication. The real novelty of communication 
with self-learning algorithms, however, goes further: it is 
an unprecedented condition in which machines parasiti-
cally take advantage of the user participation on the web 
to develop their own ability to communicate competent-
ly and informatively. These machines develop their own 
contingency, which I describe in the final part of the pa-
per referring to the interplay between human capabilities 
and the “creativity” of algorithms. This can be observed in 
AlphaGo, the computing system programmed to play the 
ancient game of GO. In the conclusion, the question as to 
whether the concept of communication can be extended 
to interaction with algorithms or whether a different con-
cept is needed remains open, but I claim that in any case 
discussion on the subject of smart algorithms should refer 
to communicative double contingency rather than to the 
psychological processes of human beings.
2  Information without 
understanding
Discourses about Big Data are now ubiquitous but still 
very opaque. What is the real point? The practical achieve-
ments are amazing: today machine learning systems are 
able to recognize images never encountered before, carry 
on conversations about unknown topics, analyze medical 
data and formulate diagnoses, as well as anticipate the 
behavior, the reasoning, and also the wishes of users. On 
the basis of Big Data we can (or will soon be able to) build 
self-driving cars, translate live online phone calls from 
one language to another, and use digital assistants that 
deliver the information we need at any given moment. 
As several observers (e.g. Kitchin 2014), however, 
claim at the theoretical level, it is not yet clear if and how 
Big Data is leading to a “computational turn in thought 
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and research” (Boyd & Crawford 2012: 663), changing the 
very idea of data, information, and, finally, science and 
knowledge (Wagner-Pacifici et al. 2015). It cannot be just 
a matter of quantity (bigger data), unless we can show 
where and how quantity becomes quality. 
The premise is the process of “datification” (May-
er-Schönberger & Cukier 2013: 73 ff.), which allows us to 
express more and more phenomena in a quantified format 
that can be analyzed and processed. Algorithms derive 
data from the information available on the web (texts, 
documents, videos, blogs, files of all types) and from the 
information provided by users: queries, recommenda-
tions, comments, chats. They are also able to extract data 
from information on information: the metadata that de-
scribe content and properties of each document, such as 
title, creator, subject, description, publisher, contributors, 
type, format, identifier, source, language, and much more. 
Social media also allow us to datify emotional and rela-
tional aspects such as feelings, moods, and relationships 
between people; and the Internet of Things can extract 
data from material entities like physical objects and spa-
tial locations. We have many more data than in previous 
times. Moreover, and most importantly, algorithms are 
able to use all these data for a variety of secondary uses 
largely independent of the intent or of the original context 
for which they were produced.8
The consequence, according to some observers (first 
Chris Anderson 2008 in an article that ignited a huge de-
bate) is that scientific reasoning as familiar to us, based on 
hypotheses to be tested and on the identification of caus-
al links, is becoming obsolete. When you have access to 
all the data and enough computational power to analyze 
it, hypotheses and explanations are no longer necessary. 
You just go directly and see the results. These results are 
not the conclusion from reasoning, but simply the iden-
tification of forms and patterns: the discovery of correla-
tions that disclose the meaning and the consequences of 
a phenomenon, regardless of any theory. This led Chris 
Anderson to the widely quoted (and widely criticized) 
statement that “with enough data, the numbers speak for 
themselves.” (Anderson 2008)
According to this approach, when you can access all 
data about a phenomenon (the statistical universe), there 
is also no need for sampling and probabilistic procedures. 
You can process the universe itself (n = all), looking for the 
patterns computers extract from the ocean of data (Kelly 
2008). Statistical procedures are seen as related to our lim-
ited computing capacity, which forces us to use simplifica-
8 See Cardon 2015 on algorithms working “below” the (surface of 
the) web.
tions and shortcuts. Now that computing capacity is vir-
tually unlimited, this would be no longer necessary, as is 
also the case with hypotheses and clever demonstrations. 
“Correlation supersedes causation.” (Anderson 2008) 
There is no need to know “why” you get a given result, 
only “what” it is (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013: 7).
This interpretation is extremely controversial and has 
been criticized under a number of aspects: data funda-
mentalism (Crawford, Miltner & Gray 2014), data fetishism 
(Sharon & Zandbergen 2016), mythology and apophenia 
(seeing patterns where none exists: boyd and Crawford 
2014: 668), reductionism (Kitchin 2014), opacity (Pasquale 
2015), confusion between correlation and causality (Cowls 
& Schroeder 2015; Floridi et al. 2016: 5), hidden bias 
(Gillespie 2014), and further ones as well. Here, however, 
I am not interested in taking a position in this debate, but 
in asking why the hypotheses about a radically new way of 
making sense of data are emerging right now and on what 
basis this is happening. What aspects of the development 
of digitization suggest a form of information processing 
fundamentally different from scientific reasoning and in-
dependent of its structures? 
The protagonists in this alleged revolution are algo-
rithms (Cardon 2015), whose advantage has always been 
that they do not require “creative” thought in their exe-
cution (Davis 1958: xv). In algorithms, and in the digital 
management of data that relies on them, the processing 
and mapping of data have nothing to do with understand-
ing  – indeed, in many cases the claim that algorhithms 
understand would be quite an obstacle. The machine has 
other ways to test the correctness of procedures. In the 
field of Big Data a certain “messiness” is a positive factor 
(Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013: 33): imprecision and 
errors make the working of algorithms more flexible, and 
are neutralized by the increase in data. When the num-
ber of elements to be analyzed grows (to today’s incredi-
ble levels of petabytes and zettabytes) not only does per-
formance not get worse, but rather it gradually becomes 
more precise and reliable – though less and less compre-
hensible (Burrell 2016).
3  Artificial Communication
The communicative relevance of Big Data is a conse-
quence: we are facing a means of processing data (and 
managing information) that is different from human in-
formation processing and understanding – and this is the 
root of the success of these technologies. Just as men were 
first able to fly when they abandoned the idea of building 
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machines that flap their wings like birds,9 digital informa-
tion processing only managed to achieve the results that 
we see today when it abandoned the ambition to repro-
duce in digital form the processes of the human mind. 
Since they do not try to imitate our consciousness, algo-
rithms have become more and more able to act as compe-
tent communication partners, responding appropriately 
to our requests and providing information that no human 
mind ever developed and that no human mind could re-
construct.10
This is evident in practice but not always in the theo-
ry. The metaphors used in the field of Big Data still retain 
reference to the human mind and its processes. Indeed, 
the idea is very widespread that the recent procedures of 
“deep learning” are so effective because they are based on 
neural networks reproducing the functioning of the hu-
man brain. As most researchers admit (Goodfellow et al. 
2016: 15; Wolchover 2014), however, we still know very lit-
tle about the working of our brain, which makes the anal-
ogy quite curious: it can be seen as an orientation to lack 
of knowledge. If the machines no longer try to understand 
meanings as the human mind does, can we find a differ-
ent, more fitting metaphor?
The recent approach of Big Data is actually very dif-
ferent from the models of Artificial Intelligence (AI) of the 
1970s and 1980s, which aimed, by imitation or by analogy 
(“strong” and “weak” AI), at reproducing with a machine 
the processes of human intelligence. Now this is no longer 
what the systems do, and some designers declare it explic-
itly: “We do not try and copy intelligence” (Solon 2012) – 
that would be too heavy a burden. Translation programs 
do not try to understand the documents and their design-
ers do not rely on any theory of language (Boellstorff 2013). 
Algorithms translate texts from Chinese without knowing 
Chinese, and the programmers do not know it either. Spell 
checkers can correct typographical errors in any language 
because they do not know the languages nor their (always 
different) spelling rules. Digital assistants operate with 
words without understanding what the words mean, and 
9 Using Hans Blumenberg’s metaphor (cf. Blumenberg 1957).
10 The idea of progressive autonomy from human performance is 
not new: all media introduce a form of communication that in some 
respect becomes autonomous from a direct coordination with human 
processes: Luhmann 1997: 216 ff. In written communication it is not 
necessary that the partners be present, with press and mass media it 
is not even required that they know anything about each other or that 
they ever met. The reader produces his or her own communication, 
with a rhythm, timing, and an order that can be quite different from 
those of the source. The information that the receiver gets is more 
and more independent of what the source had in mind. With algo-
rithms, however, apparently it is not even necessary that anyone ever 
had in mind the information derived. 
text-producing algorithms “don’t reason like people in or-
der to write like people.” (Hammond 2015: 7) Examples 
can be multiplied from all areas in which algorithms are 
most successful. Algorithms competing with human play-
ers in chess, poker, and Go do not have any knowledge of 
the games nor of the subtleties of human strategies (Sil-
ver & Hassabis 2016).11 Recommendation programs using 
collaborative filtering know absolutely nothing about the 
movies, songs or books they suggest, and can operate as 
reliable tastemakers (Grossman 2010; Kitchin 2014: 4). 
Computer-based personality judgments work “automati-
cally and without involving human socio-cognitive skills.” 
(Youyou, Kosinski & Stillwell 2014: 1036) 
One could say  – and this is the idea that I propose 
here  – that what these programs reproduce is not intel-
ligence but rather communication. What makes algo-
rithms socially relevant and useful is their ability to act as 
partners in communication that produces and circulates 
information, independently of intelligence. Can we say 
that the web does not work with Artificial Intelligence but 
with a kind of Artificial Communication which provides 
our society with unforeseen and unpredictable informa-
tion?12 Maybe society as a whole becomes “smarter” not 
because it reproduces intelligence artificially, but because 
it creates a new form of communication using data in a 
different way (Esposito 2013).
That the focus of the web is on communication rather 
than on intelligence is also confirmed by the rampant suc-
cess of the social media, which was not foreseen in any 
model of their evolution. The web today is characterized 
by contacts, links, tweets, and likes more than by mean-
ingful connections between content and between sites 
(Rogers 2013: 155; Vis 2013): it is driven by communica-
tion, not by human understanding.13 Every link (every 
act of communicative behavior) is treated as a like, and 
“liking” and “being like” also have been equated (Seaver 
2012). Everything that happens in the web becomes a fact 
and is used as a fact, having consequences and producing 
information. 
11 The programmers of Libratus, the poker AI that defeated the best 
human players in January 2017, say that “it develops a strategy com-
pletely independently from human play, and it can be very different 
from the way humans play the game.” (cf. Metz 2017b)
12 Braun-Thürmann 2013 describes “Artificial Interaction” as the 
cases in which technical artifacts are involved. I prefer to speak of 
communication in order to highlight the relevance of web connection 
and Big Data. 
13 The very distinction between social facts and personal opinions 
seem to be fading (Latour 2007).
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4  Communication and thought
If we move from referring to (artificial) consciousness 
to referring to (artificial) communication,14 however, we 
must ask different questions. What kind of communica-
tion is mediated by the web? Does it still make sense to 
talk of communication when data processing is performed 
by a machine which does not understand the communi-
cated contents? Is it still communication, and with whom? 
Obviously, the answers to these questions depend on the 
concept of communication, which should be sufficiently 
precise and powerful to cover all these cases. 
Here we can see the advantages of Luhmann’s theory, 
and the reason why I think that it is particularly appro-
priate to deal with the innovative aspects of digital com-
munication. Most theories of communication assume that 
for communication to come about, the mental processes 
of the participants must converge on some common con-
tent. The partners must share the same thought, or at 
least part of it, whether they agree about it or not. Even 
when theories do not require the identity of information 
(minus noise) in the sense of Shannon and Weaver and of 
transmission models, at least they expect some identity 
in decoding meaning or interpretation. In the interaction 
with machines, however, we are dealing with a situation 
in which the communication partner is an algorithm that 
does not understand the content, the meaning, or the in-
terpretations, and works not despite, but because of this. 
The users cannot share any content with their interlocu-
tor because the interlocutor does not have access to any 
content. At issue here is whether communication comes 
about or not. Is this always an “aberrant” situation?15 How 
can one keep some control over the ongoing processes and 
adequately describe what is happening?
When we are dealing with a partner who does not 
think, the concept of communication in the theory of so-
cial systems has the great advantage of not being based 
on psychological content and not requiring any sharing of 
thoughts among the participants. Communication is de-
fined starting not from the source, but from the receiver, 
who can derive information different from what the utterer 
had in mind.16 According to Luhmann (1984: 193 ff.), com-
14 As proposed also by Malsch and Schlieder 2004, who suggest de-
veloping Communication Oriented Modeling (COM) as an alternative 
to Agent Oriented Modeling (AOM).
15 In the sense of the “aberrant decoding” of semiotics (Eco and 
Fabbri 1978).
16 The advantage has been observed also by Malsch and Schlieder 
2004, who propose replacing the usual “intentional stance” with a 
“receptional stance.”
munication exists not when somebody says something,17 
but when somebody realizes that someone else said some-
thing. You can write entire books and make elaborate 
speeches, but if no one reads or listens, it is not plausible 
to think that communication has come about. However, 
if a receiver understands information that (according to 
him or her) someone meant to utter, communication has 
taken place – whatever the information and whatever the 
source had (or did not have) in mind. Communication is 
thus defined as a unit of three types of selection: of in-
formation, of utterance (Mitteilung), and of understanding 
(ibid: 196).18
The power and improbability of this notion of com-
munication are related to the fact (which is fundamental 
for our focus on algorithms) that it does not include the 
thoughts of the participants, hence in principle could 
also involve participants who do not think (such as algo-
rithms). The fact that communication is independent of 
thought, however, does not mean that communication 
can proceed without the participation of thinking people. 
If no one listens and no one participates, communica-
tion doesn’t take place. Communication requires partici-
pants who think; nevertheless, it is not dependent on or 
made up of their thoughts. Conversely, you can know the 
thoughts of participants without knowing the meaning of 
the ongoing communication.
The result is the paradox, often difficult to accept, of 
total dependence on and total independence of communi-
cation from consciousness, i.e. from the thoughts of par-
ticipants (Luhmann 2002: 273). 19 In order for information 
to enter the communication circuit, an utterance by some-
one must be understood. Natural phenomena do not in-
duce communication if they are not observed and reported 
by someone. Layers of rock are communicatively informa-
tive only when a geologist who can interpret them speaks 
about them in class or writes an article (communicates) 
about them and someone listens to his or her communica-
tion or reads it. The same applies to bodies (a disease does 
not communicate if there isn’t someone interpreting and 
communicating the symptoms) and to machines. In all 
17 Or writes, or broacasts, since the concept is not bound to oral 
communication. 
18 Strictly speaking, it should be specified that the understanding 
included in the definition of communication has a social and not a 
psychic reference: it does not coincide with what the receiver un-
derstands and thinks, but refers to the potential of meaning (Sinn) 
available to any possible participant in the communication, who can 
always understand it in a different way: cf. Luhmann 1988; 1997: 73.
19 “Communication happens only through consciousness with the 
help of consciousness, so never operationally as consciousness”: 
Luhmann 2002: 274.
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these cases, one communicates with the utterer, not with 
rocks or with bodies. In this sense, communication is to-
tally dependent on the presence of consciousness, which 
must not only develop a thought, but also must be moti-
vated to communicate it and to pay attention to what is be-
ing said / written (which is not at all obvious). At the same 
time communication remains independent of individual 
thoughts, because those who read the article by the geol-
ogist don’t know his or her thoughts and may understand 
the text in a different way than intended.20 On the basis 
of your individual perspective and your background, you 
can draw from a communicative event information that 
the utterer did not have in mind and perhaps doesn’t even 
know, yet which is a result of the communicative event. 
And another person may understand the communication 
in a different way. Basically every bit of information is dif-
ferent for every participant because we each understand 
everything from our idiosyncratic point of view (von Fo-
erster 1970). Nevertheless we communicate – indeed, we 
communicate precisely because of this. 
Even if it is does not consist of people and of their 
thoughts, communication as we know it so far (also as 
distant communication conveyed by technologies like 
print or television) normally requires the participation 
of the consciousness of at least two persons who address 
their thoughts to it. There must be someone (or several 
people) who for some reason listen(s) / read(s) / watch(es) 
that someone else for some reason utters something (Luh-
mann 1988). This distinguishes communication from sim-
ple perception, including the perception of others and of 
their behavior. We get a lot of information by watching (or 
otherwise analyzing) not only objects and living beings, 
but also the appearance and the behavior of humans; we 
study plants and stones, machines and bodies; but we 
do not communicate with them. Communication comes 
about when the observer not only learns something but 
also knows that someone is purposely saying (or writing, 
or somehow conveying) this something, i.e. when he or 
she not only gets information but also knows that some-
one wants to convey it. 
This cannot be taken for granted, because everyone 
can turn their attention wherever they want, and not every 
observation is a communication. Since Parsons, sociolo-
gy has spoken of a condition of double contingency21 to 
20 The theory of social systems speaks of “structural coupling” be-
tween communication and consciousness, using a term proposed by 
Humberto Maturana in biology. Cf. Luhmann 1997: 92 ff.
21 The term was originally introduced by Parsons (Parsons & Shils 
1951: 3-29), and later taken up by Luhmann 1984: 148 ff. Here I refer to 
Luhmann’s more abstract understanding of the term. 
indicate the very specific situation in which both the re-
ceiver and the source, who can always turn their attention 
elsewhere,22 each refer to the contingency of the other. 
Contingency is double not simply because there are two 
contingent participants, but because each of them decides 
what to do (or select) depending on what the other is do-
ing (selecting), and both know this.23 Double contingency 
as reflected contingency is the defining condition of any 
communicative event.
5  Communicating with a partner 
who does not think
What if one participant is an algorithm that does not 
think, does not intend, and does not have expectations? 
What happens to double contingency? If we still want 
to talk of communication we must include the case in 
which there is only one person, facing a smart algorithm 
that can participate in the communication. But in order 
to be a communication partner this algorithm must oper-
ate differently from a machine or a watch, from which we 
get information but with which we do not communicate. 
Where is the difference? Are the defining elements of com-
munication still present? Do smart algorithms perform as 
a communicative partner thus providing the equivalent of 
double contingency?
The entire issue of communication with machines and, 
if you want, what remains of the Turing test (Turing 1950), 
depend on the answers to these questions. What matters 
is not whether the person is or is not aware that they are 
dealing with a machine, because this now happens every 
day and usually is not relevant. Today we all communicate 
with bots without knowing it (in online service, videog-
ames, social media), and even when we know it, as with 
personal assistants, normally we do not care.24 What mat-
22 They are contingent in the sense of modal theory. Something is 
contingent when it is neither impossible nor necessary. It can exist or 
not exist, or exist otherwise: Esposito 2012.
23 In its “pure” form, double contingency produces the paradox of 
circular mutual dependency: “I do what you want if you do what I 
want.” (Luhmann 1984: 166) Who starts? In fact, normally there are 
structures that orient behavior and solve the paralysis: someone 
greets, nods, says something.
24 A test on WeChat (a popular messaging app in China) on May 29, 
2015 with the chatbot xiaoice showed that people generally don’t 
care whether they are chatting with a machine (Wang 2016). In a few 
weeks, xiaoice had become the 6th most active celebrity on Weibo and 
had tens of billions of conversations with people, mostly about pri-
vate matters. The experiment has been considered the largest Turing 
test in history. 
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ters is whether the interaction with the machine has the 
features of communication with a contingent autonomous 
partner. Otherwise, it is a form of perception of objects in 
the environment, which can be extremely complex and 
informative but with different assumptions and conse-
quences. For example, one can be interested in knowing 
how a machine-object (e.g. a watch) works and for what 
purposes, but does not get angry with the watch for being 
late nor care about understanding what it intends.25 And 
especially one does not use its indeterminacy to structure 
one’s own, as happens in communication (which is a very 
important point for software programming strategy).
In principle the conclusion cannot be excluded that 
interaction with algorithms is communication, but this 
must be specified. As we saw above, in a definition accord-
ing to systems theory, communication does not consist of 
the thoughts of the participants, so theoretically it can also 
include participants who do not communicate under the 
condition that the recipient thinks they do.26 It is only re-
quired that the unit information-utterance-understanding 
is accomplished, i.e. that the recipient understands spe-
cific information related to the communicative intention 
of the counterparty in that event. Not only does the recip-
ient understand the information, he or she also knows (or 
thinks) that it was uttered by the partner, and that it could 
be different (contingent). For example, if someone waves 
their hand to chase away a fly but someone watching them 
thinks that they wanted to say good-bye, communication 
comes about, even if the alleged source had something 
else in mind. Or if a reader thinks that the shopping list 
written by Montale, who only wanted to write a memo and 
did not intend to communicate anything to anyone, is a 
poem and interprets it and comments on it in this sense, 
a communication will have come about in the world and 
have consequences, no matter what Montale may have 
meant. The thoughts of the utterer are not part of the com-
munication, and the receiver cannot access them anyway. 
If some information related to his or her behavior is under-
stood and produces further communication (if the receiver 
resumes contact with the person who greeted him or her 
or talks with others about their meeting, or if one writes an 
article about Montale’s poem) communication has taken 
place.
25 This is not a question of interpretation in the sense of the tradi-
tion of hermeneutics, from Schleiermacher onwards. In the words of 
observation theory, it is not a second-order observation (Luhmann 
1990).
26 Someone chooses a behavior that communicates the information. 
“This can be done intentionally or unintentionally.” (Luhmann 1988: 
195)
Although erroneous from the point of view of the 
source, such borderline cases involve two human interloc-
utors, one of which may not be thinking about the ongoing 
communication, but, importantly, that person is thinking. 
The case is pointedly different in which the partner to 
whom the communication is attributed27 is not a human 
being and does not operate on the basis of thoughts, and 
its partner knows this. Can we still speak of communica-
tion? How must a machine behave in order to be a commu-
nication partner?
There are precedents. Luhmann routinely communi-
cated with a nonhuman interlocutor, as he claims in the 
article describing his communication with his much dis-
cussed box of file-cards (Zettelkasten: Luhmann 1981). But 
this was a file-box built up over many decades on the ba-
sis of a complex architecture of links and references. For 
communication to come about, actually, it is not enough 
that the file-box provides the information that the user 
recorded years before and now cannot remember. When 
you reflect on your thoughts you do not communicate with 
yourself, not even if the thoughts are reproduced at a lat-
er date (Luhmann 1985). There is no double contingency 
and no production of specific information in the commu-
nication act. But Luhmann’s Zettelkasten was structured 
in such a complex way that it could produce authentic 
surprises and did not simply act as a container (Behälter), 
allowing the author to retrieve what he once put in it. The 
information “produced” in the act of communication was 
the result of a query (Anfrage), which activated the inter-
nal network of references, and it was different from what 
had been stored by Luhmann in his notes (Luhmann 1981: 
59). Of course, the archive is not contingent in the sense of 
autonomously deciding what to do and not to do; yet it is 
perceived by the user as unpredictable, informative, and 
reacting to the specific requests of its partner. The answers 
Luhmann got as a result of his query did not exist before 
his quest. In such cases the added value of communica-
tion is present since, as Luhmann himself experienced, 
the file-box acts as a communication partner.28 Commu-
27 Or “addressed,” in the words of Fuchs 1997.
28 In this case, however, presumably only for Luhmann. Luhmann’s 
box of file-cards communicates with Luhmann and with nobody else. 
This does not rule out the possibility that others can consult the files 
for communication purposes, as the long-term project (2015–2030) 
“Niklas Luhmann – A Passion for Theory. Publishing His Literary Es-
tate and Making It Accessible for Research” at the University of Biele-
feld assumes (cf. Schmidt 2017). But these readers communicate with 
Luhmann through the box, not with the box itself. 
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nication has occurred although no one would think of the 
archive as a person.29 
In Luhmann’s reflections in the article mentioned, 
this form of communication is not particularly problem-
atic.30 In most cases there are actually two or more people 
participating in communication, and the reduction to a 
single individual is the exception. Cases such as these, in 
which the recipient mistakenly attributes to the source the 
intention to communicate, must be rare, because beyond 
a certain threshold it is very difficult to coordinate such 
cases of one-sided communication. Exceptions notorious-
ly prove the rule, but they must remain exceptions. Today, 
however, with more widespread communication via algo-
rithms, this kind of case seems to occur more often and in 
a much more complex way. Think about digital personal 
assistants like Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s 
Cortana, etc. or about the many cases of conversations 
with social bots. Through interaction with algorithms, us-
ers get a lot of information that, in many cases, did not 
exist before they formulated their query and is different 
from what other human beings entered in the sources and 
databases. Are these users then communicating with al-
gorithms?
6  Virtual contingency
Algorithms are not human and do not want to be human. 
But the discriminating factor, as we saw, is not whether 
the utterer is a person but whether there is double contin-
gency, which has up to now normally required the partici-
pation of two people. The question we must address is not 
whether algorithms are people and not even whether they 
are perceived as people, but whether in the interaction 
with algorithms a condition of double contingency arises 
in which each partner is oriented towards the indetermi-
nacy of his or her counterparty and specific information 
is produced.31 We must ask whether and how algorithms 
can become contingent and hence reflect the contingency 
29 What is lacking is evidently motivation. Here the utterance is sep-
arated from the intention to communicate. The archive responds to 
the queries of the questioner, but does not “want” to communicate 
anything. On the difference between the “classic” concept of commu-
nication and a possible new form of communication with algorithms, 
see below § 7.
30 The article describing it is presented as a kind of joke and partly 
as a provocation. 
31 According to Luhmann, 1997: 304, it is an open question “wheth-
er work or play with computers can be conceived as communication; 
whether for example the feature of double contingency is present on 
both sides. Therefore it also remains an open question whether one 
of the users, and how this contingency is controlled in the 
communication process. 
Contingency means that there are open possibilities, 
therefore selection and a certain level of uncertainty. Al-
gorithms by definition do not know uncertainty, because 
they proceed without making decisions and without cre-
ativity, merely following the instructions that program 
their behavior. This is their strength and the reason why 
they can operate efficiently and reliably. Algorithms and 
traditional machines can be informative, like a watch that 
tells us something we did not know before (the time), but 
the information is not uncertain or unpredictable. Differ-
ent watches all indicate the same time if they work prop-
erly. As von Foerster (1985: 129) observed, if a traditional 
machine becomes unpredictable we do not think that it is 
creative or original, we think that it is broken.
The dilemma faced by the designers of smart algo-
rithms, on the contrary, is how to build machines which 
are surprising but useful, i.e. how to program and control 
the production of appropriate and informative surprises. 
An algorithm that works perfectly (i.e. is not broken) pro-
duces a contingent outcome. Cozmo, a real-life toy robot 
based on a series of machine-learning algorithms,32 is 
“programmed to be unpredictable” (Pierce 2016a), but 
also to be responsive and fun. Social algorithms not only 
provide information but respond appropriately to user re-
quests, producing new and relevant information. The par-
adoxical purpose of programming intelligent algorithms is 
to build unpredictable machines in a controlled way. The 
goal is to control the lack of control (Esposito 1997).
In some cases the contingency of the machine is sim-
ply the projection of the contingency of the user. This hap-
pens with the robotic toys studied by Sherry Turkle (2011), 
which function as communication partners because chil-
dren or elderly people interacting with them project onto 
them their own contingency. This has always happened 
with dolls and puppets, with which children play as if the 
toys understand and respond to their behavior. The perfor-
mance of robotic toys, which allows them to be more fun 
than traditional dolls, is not their ability to understand 
but their ability to “perform understanding” (ibid: 26) in 
an elaborate and seemingly reactive way. Algorithms al-
low the machine to react to the behavior of the user, and 
this in turn allows the user to project onto the machine 
his or her own contingency and meanings more efficiently 
should change the concept of communication and how, if one want-
ed to include this case.”
32 https://anki.com/en-us/cozmo
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than in the interaction with a mute doll (ibid: 39–40).33 A 
toy behaves differently depending on what the user does, 
making it easier for the user to interpret its behavior as 
communication. An algorithmically driven machine does 
not give an intelligent answer; it only gives an answer that 
may become intelligent for the user.34
A surrogate of double contingency is produced be-
cause the user faces his or her own contingency in an 
externalized and elaborated form, and interprets it as 
communication – somehow like Luhmann in his alleged 
communication with his Zettelkasten. In both cases the 
interlocutor (the file-box, the robotic toy) has a sufficient-
ly complex structure for the interaction to produce infor-
mation different from what the user already knows, and 
this information is attributed to the partner. The user com-
municates with the machine even if the machine does not 
communicate with the user.
It is not only children who do this, and it does not 
happen only in interaction with anthropomorphic or 
animal-like devices, such as the robotic seals and dogs 
studied by Turkle. Various experiments show that people, 
without realizing it, deal with computers as if they were 
real people (Nass & Yan 2010). For example they evalu-
ate the work of the computer in more positive terms if the 
assessment is done on the same computer; it is as if they 
did not want to offend it. These dynamics, however, have 
rather restrictive limits. The user encounters information 
he or she already has, but gets the opportunity to observe 
it from a different perspective. This can produce addition-
al information if the user is able to grasp it, but this is not 
really a different perspective. One observes one’s own 
perspective from another angle and does not observe the 
perspective of someone else.
The results can be complex and rewarding. Contin-
gency is multiplied because it can be observed from the 
outside. The user experiences a kind of “virtualization” of 
his or her own contingency, as observed in a mirror that 
generates a virtual image.35 The independent object that 
you see in the mirror does not exist where the image is: 
you cannot touch, manipulate, or modify it. You cannot 
enter the mirror. The image, however, is not an illusion: 
if there is nothing to reflect, no virtual image is produced 
(Esposito 1995). The mirror shows the image of objects that 
really exist, but not where they seem to be. It shows them 
33 This is also true in the case of refined robots like Cozmo. “It’s up to 
the humans playing with them to provide creativity” (Pierce 2016a). 
34 The basic issue in video-game design, for example, is “creating 
the illusion of intelligence (…) rather than creating true intelligence.” 
(Dill 2013, pp. 3–4)
35 On virtualization of sense references in cyberspace, see Thie-
decke 2013.
as if they were somewhere else, thereby making it possible 
to see them from a different perspective. The observer can 
see the objects simultaneously from two different points 
of view, from the front and from the back, and see things 
he or she could not see otherwise. But the objects remain 
what they are and are not duplicated. Only the perspec-
tives are duplicated. The observer notices this when he or 
she observes him- or herself in a mirror: he or she can see 
how others see them, and this can be very useful and even 
surprising,36 but the image by itself does not behave sur-
prisingly or unexpected, and certainly not independently. 
The observer interacts with him- or herself, not with an-
other observer.
Something similar occurs with the reflection of con-
tingency in the interaction with robotic toys. Consequent-
ly, we can speak of the virtualization of contingency. The 
interaction is meaningful because it produces information 
that did not exist previously, neither for the user nor for 
the machine. But this contingency is the result of the du-
plication of the perspective of the user, who observes his 
or her own contingency from a different perspective. The 
observers are not duplicated, what is duplicated is the per-
spective of the same observer. No authentic reflected (and 
unpredictable) double contingency is produced between 
two communicating parties. What is doubled is the contin-
gency of a single observer interacting with him- or herself 
as if they were someone else. But two cases of simple con-
tingency do not make up double contingency. In this inter-
action the observer can certainly acquire information that 
he or she could not get otherwise, can have fun and find 
company, but does not face the variety and unpredictabil-
ity of a truly different perspective, as in communication.
Smart algorithms, however, go further, and do some-
thing different and more enigmatic than robotic toys.37 
When users interact with an algorithm capable of learning 
(maybe unsupervised: Russell & Norvig 2003: 763 f.; Etzi-
oni 2016), they face a contingency that is not their own – 
even though it does not belong to the machine. They do 
not observe themselves from a different perspective, they 
face someone else’s perspective. The machine in this case 
is not only behaving in such a way as to allow users to 
think that it communicates, it actually produces informa-
tion from a different perspective. The perspective that the 
machine presents is still a reflected perspective because 
the algorithm inevitably does not know contingency, but 
it is not the perspective of the user. The algorithm reflects 
and represents the perspective of other observers, and us-
36 And full of consequences, as Narcissus (and Lacan) show.
37 Obviously robots that utilize forms of machine learning fall into 
this category. 
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ers observe through the machine a re-elaboration of other 
users’ observations.
7  Googlization
Where does the algorithm find the contingency it must 
reflect? How does it access the external perspectives it 
elaborates and presents to its users? To be able to act as 
communication partners, algorithms must be on the web 
(Hardy 2016). Artificial communication would not be pos-
sible without the web, as smart and sophisticated as algo-
rithms can be. Actually the issue of communication with 
algorithms emerged when algorithms were connected to 
the web. The path-breaking effect of Web 2.0 (and pre-
sumably of Web 3.0) is not so much customization as the 
inclusion and exploitation of virtual contingency, which 
parasitically “feeds” on contributions by the users and 
uses them actively to increase its own complexity – and 
also the complexity of communication. Apparently we can 
communicate with algorithms experiencing an (artificial) 
form of unpredictability and reflection – or, if you will, of 
double contingency.
The symbol of this approach is Google, and this is also 
the reason for its huge success. The breakthrough came in 
1998 with the introduction of link analysis after the spread 
of the world wide web, which had then existed for almost 
10 years (Langville & Meyer 2006: 4 ff.). Earlier informa-
tion retrieval was a search in a limited, non-linked, and 
static collection of documents. Organization and catego-
rization of information were entrusted to specialists such 
as librarians, journal editors, or experts in various fields. 
Link analysis, in contrast, is based on the web and intro-
duces a form of information retrieval that has become 
huge, dynamic (unlike traditional documents, web pages 
are constantly changing their content), hyperlinked, but 
above all self-organized. The structure is decided not by 
experts but by the dynamics of the web. And it is incom-
parably more efficient.
It was a radical conceptual turn adopted in the design 
of the algorithm PageRank by Google, which thus “in-
vented” the Internet as we know it today (Metz 2012). Its 
authors, and later owners of the company, described it in 
a 1999 article (Page at al.)38 as exploiting the link struc-
ture of the web as a large hypertext system. The key in-
sight was to determine which pages are important and for 
38 Interestingly, the third author, with Larry Page and Sergey Brin, is 
Terry Winograd, who, a decade earlier, wrote, together with Fernan-
do Flores, one of the reference texts for a communication-oriented 
approach to artificial intelligence: cf. Winograd & Flores 1986.
whom, disregarding completely the content of the pages 
themselves (ibid: 15). To appropriately decide the ranking 
of pages in responding to users’ requests, the system uses 
information that is external to the Web pages and refers 
rather to what other users have done in their previous ac-
tivity. In other words, to decide which pages are import-
ant PageRank does not go and see what they say and how 
they say it, but looks at how often they were linked to and 
by whom. PageRank is based on the number of backlinks 
to the pages (how many times they have been pointed to 
by other websites) and on their importance, according to 
the model of scholarly referees – where the “importance” 
of backlinks depends on how many links they have. The 
definition of relevance is openly circular: “a page has high 
rank if the sum of the ranks of its backlinks is high” (ibid: 
3), including both the case of a page with many not par-
ticularly authoritative backlinks and that of a page with a 
few highly linked backlinks.
The genius of PageRank lies in completely giving up 
understanding what the page says and relying solely on 
the structure and the dynamics of communication. Goo-
gle’s creators do not even try to come up with a great or-
ganizational scheme for the web based on experienced 
and competent consultants, as did the competing search 
engines from Altavista to Yahoo. They do not try to under-
stand and not try to build an algorithm that understands. 
“Instead, they got everyone else to do it for them” (Grim-
melmann 2009: 941) when surfing the net and making 
connections. Content came into play later, as a result of 
the classification and not as a premise. Google uses the 
links to learn not only how important a page is, but also 
what it is about. If the links to a given page use a certain 
sentence, the system infers that the sentence accurately 
describes that page and takes this into account for later 
searches. The algorithm is designed to apprehend and 
reflect the choices made by the users (Gillespie 2014). It 
activates a recursive loop in which the users use the algo-
rithm to get the information, their research modifies the 
algorithm, and the algorithm then impinges on their sub-
sequent searches for information. What the programmers 
design is only the algorithm’s ability to self-modify. What 
the algorithm selects and how, depends on how the users 
use it.
The system has been developed in order to take into 
account not only popularity but also other factors such as 
users click behavior, reading time, or patterns of query re-
formulation (Granka 2010: 367). As Google declares in the 
InsideSearch pages of its website,39 today algorithms rely 
39 Cf. Google, at: https://www.google.com/insidesearch/ 
howsearchworks (accessed on July 17, 2016).
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on more than 200 signals and clues referring to “things 
like the terms in websites, the freshness of content, your 
region.” The company has produced a Knowledge Graph 
that provides a semantic connection between the various 
entities and allows for more rapid and appropriate re-
sponses, also including information and answers no one 
had previously thought of (Hamburger 2012). The “intelli-
gence” of the system derives from the use of the previous 
web activity and from the sources of information available 
on the web and from Wikipedia to databases of common 
knowledge in order to give people what they are looking 
for even if they do not know what this is. As John Gianan-
drea, Director of Engineering at Google, declares, when, 
for example, one is looking for Einstein on Google, “We’re 
not trying to tell you what’s important about Einstein  – 
we’re trying to tell you about what humanity is looking for 
when they search.” The intelligence of the system is still 
the intelligence of the users that the algorithm exploits to 
direct and organize its behavior.
Google has become the symbol of an approach that 
can be found in all successful projects on the web. Since 
2003 the term “googlization” (Rogers 2013: 83ff) has been 
introduced to describe the spread in more and more appli-
cations and contexts of a model that does not rely on tra-
ditional status makers like editors or experts, but “feeds” 
on the dynamics of the web to organize its operations and 
even itself. The web is guided by a “googlization of every-
thing” (Vaidhyanathan 2011), which takes advantage of 
the operations performed by users to produce a condition 
in which “Google works for us because it seems to read our 
minds” (ibid: 51), but actually does not need to do this. 
What it does is use the results of our minds to give direc-
tions, and then produce information that none of us had 
in mind.
Google, and all systems that work in the same way, 
feed on the information provided by users to produce oth-
er information which it introduces into the communica-
tion circuit.40 It is this information that users, if they are 
able to understand it, get from the interaction with algo-
rithms, and that cannot be attributed to anything except 
the algorithms. In the communication with algorithms, it 
does not make sense to refer to the perspective of those 
who entered the data because they could not know how 
the data would be used, and it makes no sense to refer 
to what the algorithm intends because it did not intend 
anything. Constraints and orientation do not depend on 
intentions but on programs, which are normally inacces-
sible (Luhmann 2002: 143). The utterance (Mitteilung) se-
40 Luhmann 1997: 118: “we can regard as likely that computers will 
allow for other forms of structural coupling.” 
lects the information relevant for the ongoing communica-
tion, but the criteria that guide this selection by programs 
do not serve to orient understanding. The real innovation 
in the communication with algorithms is that understand-
ing is no longer oriented to the meaning of an utterance.41
As Sherry Turkle remarks (2011: 55), what you lose 
talking with a bot or a robot as a communication partner 
is alterity, “the ability to see the world through the eyes of 
another.” Algorithms do not act as alter egos, and if you 
communicate with an algorithm you do not communicate 
with an alter ego. You do not observe how another (like 
yourself) observes, you observe through the algorithm 
what others also can observe in communication.42
Nevertheless, in maintaining all the differences be-
tween interaction with algorithms and interaction with 
human beings,43 we could conceive of this as a new form 
of communication. The user receives a contingent re-
sponse that reacts to his or her contingency and does not 
just reflect his or her indeterminacy. The algorithm makes 
selections and choices based on criteria that are not ran-
dom, but that the user does not know and need not know. 
The algorithm reflects and elaborates the indeterminacy 
of all participants, and each user faces the contingency of 
all the others, which is infinitely surprising and informa-
tive. It is still virtual contingency, but reflected in a mirror 
in which everyone sees not him- or herself but the other 
observers communicating – generating a kind of “virtual 
double contingency.” They do not communicate with him 
or her, but the result is the answer to the user’s specific 
questions and would not exist if they weren’t asked. The 
success of Google and of the models that adopt the same 
strategy is due to this: apparently their algorithms com-
municate with users and are able to do so precisely be-
cause they do not try to understand content. They do not 
artificially reproduce intelligence, but do directly engage 
in communication.
41 “The unity of utterance (Mitteilung) and understanding is aban-
doned”: Luhmann 1997: 309 – even if both are still required in any 
communication. 
42 According to Luhmann (2002: 314), “One is first-order observer 
again.”
43 The result is not a form of “hybridization” (Hayles 2012) because 
the working of algorithms relies on the ability to process psychic con-
tingency in their own forms, i.e. on the difference and not the mixture 
of human and digital processes. 
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8  What algorithms learn
If this is still communication, we are dealing with a form 
of artificial communication. By artificial I mean not only 
that it was produced by someone because obviously all 
communication is artificial in this sense.44 By artificial 
communication I mean communication that involves 
an entity, the algorithm, which has been built and pro-
grammed by someone to act as a communication partner. 
It is artificial because you communicate with the product 
of someone without communicating with the person who 
produced it.45
What is artificial is the perspective of the partner that 
is produced by the algorithm starting from the perspectives 
of web users. The algorithm uses them to create a different 
perspective, one that becomes that of the communication 
partner with whom users interact. It succeeds in doing so 
if it learns to learn by itself, i.e. to develop a practice of 
unsupervised learning, in which the algorithm does not 
learns what others teach. Instead it decides autonomously 
what to learn and what to communicate.46 Unsupervised 
learning, however, is predictably rather enigmatic, as the 
classic communicative paradox of the Palo Alto school 
(Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson 1962) has it: “be sponta-
neous,” or be creative. But how can you teach creativity, 
i.e., how can you program learning without knowing what 
the student-machine has to learn? This is not the classic 
educational problem of teaching to learn (Luhmann & 
Schorr 1979: 85), teaching a methodology and not content. 
Here not only do you not know what, you do not even 
know how the algorithm is supposed to learn, because it 
does not reproduce human capabilities. The power of the 
algorithm relies on operating differently.
In practice, unsupervised learning is realized as rein-
forcement learning,47 in which the algorithm works freely 
44 And obviously many communications involve humanly con-
structed (i.e. artificial) entities (ANT’s socio-technical devices: for 
example Callon 2004), but not as communication partners. Malsch 
1997 speaks of Artificial Societies as a provocation. 
45 All social objects are constructed, hence not natural, but this 
does not mean that in using them one communicates. You don’t com-
municate with the maker of a corkscrew when you understand how 
it works, and you don’t communicate with the corkscrew itself (Eco 
2012). You can communicate through objects, as in the case of works 
of art or design, and of course in the case of books – but then you 
communicate with the author. The object is artificial, not the com-
munication.
46 The algorithm itself is quite general: it can learn to solve any 
possible problem, from playing Go to controlling the parameters of a 
cooling system in order to improve fuel efficiency (Taylor 2016).
47 Strictly speaking there is a difference because real unsupervised 
learning is used when you do not even know what you are looking for 
and in the end is told which results are satisfactory (Rus-
sell and Norvig 2003: 763 f.; Etzioni 2016). You do not teach 
the machine to do things (as in supervised learning). The 
machine makes random moves, as if it tried to play a game 
without knowing the rules, and after a number of attempts 
you tell it whether it has won or lost (reinforcement). You 
do not teach the algorithm the moves and not even the 
rules, but, as shown by the much-discussed competitions 
in chess or GO, it can be enabled to defeat the most qual-
ified champions. The algorithm uses reinforcements to 
calculate in its own way an evaluation function that indi-
cates which moves to make – without making predictions, 
without a game strategy, without “thinking,” and with-
out imagining the perspective of the counterparty. As the 
programmers of AlphaGo, the computing system built by 
Google to play GO, say: “our goal is to beat the best human 
players, not just to mimic them” (Silver & Hassabis 2016). 
The machine does not reason like human beings and in its 
behavior there is nothing to understand.48 AlphaGo does 
not plan what to do depending on the opponent’s moves, 
but calculates and decides while playing. The program-
mers themselves do not understand the “reasoning” of the 
algorithm. When they tell it that something is “wrong,” 
they merely signal that there is an error, without telling 
what it is and without even knowing what it is.
In interaction with users, a learning algorithm gathers 
a lot of reinforcements of this kind from the behavior of 
people: if they accept the result, if they click, if they go 
on searching. It then uses them to direct its own behavior, 
which becomes more and more refined. AlphaGo and oth-
er game algorithms learn via self-play, refining their skills 
using a trial and error process (Schölkopf 2015; Mnih et al. 
2015). The system is trained with data from a server that 
allows people to play against each other on the Internet. 
The players are all amateurs and the skills acquired are 
rather coarse, but the program enormously refines them in 
playing millions of games against itself. The system learns 
“not just from human moves, but from moves generated 
by multiple versions of itself.” (Metz 2016a) In this process 
of “self-supervised learning” (Etzioni et al. 2006) the algo-
rithm becomes incomparably better than the players from 
and ask the machine to find a particular configuration, letting “data 
speak” (Amoore & Piotukh 2015: 351). Actually, however, there are al-
ways too many results that fit the data, most of which are irrelevant. 
One must therefore choose, deciding which results are valuable and 
will be used (Agrawal 2003; Agrawal at al. 1993). If the operations 
proceed, the selection itself is a form of reinforcement, of the com-
municative sort.
48 The features in the high-dimensional space of the algorithm have 
no human interpretation: they are just the values of the hidden nodes 
in a network that was trained for a task: Taylor 2016.
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which it learned, who would not be able to understand 
its moves. It can learn how to win at GO or at videogames 
and can learn to give satisfactory answers to user requests, 
but it does not learn anything about the world, about the 
users, or about the issues it deals with. It only learns about 
itself (Hammond 2015: 27).
The algorithm does not become more informed or 
more intelligent; it just learns to work better. But thereby 
it can produce increasingly complex communication with 
its users, who can learn unknown things about the world 
and about themselves. Communication becomes more 
effective, and new information is produced. “A lot of sit-
uations where you invoke machine learning, are because 
you do not really understand what the system should do” 
(Michael Warner, a robotic CMU researcher, quoted in 
Pierce 2016a), but you can learn it from the working of the 
machine itself.
We can learn from communication with algorithms. 
An example is the already legendary move 37 in the game 
of March 2016 between Lee Sedol, one of the world’s top 
GO players, and AlphaGo. The move has been described 
by all observers as absolutely surprising. “It was not a 
human move” and couldn’t have come to the mind of any 
human being (Metz 2016c). It was actually produced by 
an algorithm that does not have a mind, but is the move 
that allowed it to win the game and then the encounter. 
Looking back later, GO players found the move absolutely 
beautiful and brilliant and used it to rethink their game 
strategies, dramatically improving them  – they started 
to learn.49 Following this revision, Lee Sedol himself pro-
duced the celebrated highly unlikely (1 in 10,000) move 78 
(“The Touch of God”) in the 4th game with AlphaGo, the 
only one he actually won (Metz 2016b; Taylor 2016).
The player defeated the algorithm by re-elaborating 
with human skills a move that no human could devise. 
It is likely that the algorithm will now also incorporate 
move 78 in its range of possibilities and will also learn to 
manage it and its consequences,50 but it would not have 
been able to do this without the human intervention that 
devised it – and, in fact, the algorithm lost that game. No 
algorithm, however high its self-learning ability, can gen-
erate possibilities that are not implicit in the data supplied 
(Etzioni 2016). No algorithm can independently generate 
contingency, but the contingency that the algorithm pro-
49 Ke Jie, a Chinese grandmaster who met AphaGo in a match in May 
2017, explicitly declared that the algorithm changed the way the top 
masters play the game, making moves that are reminiscent of Alpha-
Go’s own style (Mozur 2017). 
50 AlphaGo actually also won the three-match series against Ke Jie 
in May 2017.
cesses can also be the result of the interaction of human 
beings with the algorithm.
9  Conclusion
Even and especially if the algorithm is not an alter ego, 
does not work with a strategy, and does not understand 
its counterpart, in interaction with machines human us-
ers can learn something that no one knew before or could 
have imagined, which changes their way of observing. 
People learning to learn from machines increases the com-
plexity of communication in general. In the case of GO it 
was the game strategy, but the same mechanisms have 
been applied in designing other social algorithms.51 
This is what sociological theory should be able to 
deal with. Whether one decides that interaction with al-
gorithms is a specific form of communication and that the 
concept of communication should be amended according-
ly or one decides that algorithms are not communication 
partners, what matters is to adequately describe the de-
velopment of digital communication. We must be able to 
show how interaction with algorithms affects the commu-
nication of society in general (Luhmann 1997: 304) and to 
provide insights that can help to direct the work of those 
who program and build algorithms. 
In more and more areas, reference to intelligence does 
not help, be they cases in which things are communicat-
ing (e.g. the Internet of Things) or cases in which commu-
nication is treated as a thing (e.g. Digital Humanities). The 
scenario of the Internet of Things (IoT) involves a network 
that connects machines, people, and real world objects 
interacting with one another as people do in the web to-
day (Höller et al. 2014). The idea is that objects can com-
municate with objects and people in the same way that 
people communicate with other people, extending enor-
mously the boundaries and forms of possible interactions. 
At the same time, and conversely, a new form of algorith-
mic reading seems to be emerging (Hayles 2012: 46; Sneha 
2014; Kirschenbaum 2007) where texts are treated not as 
communication but as objects.52 A set of algorithms pro-
51 “Because the methods we have used are general purpose ones, 
our hope is that one day they could be extended to help us address 
some of society’s toughest and most pressing problems.”(Silver and 
Hassabis 2016) Actually the techniques developed in AlphaGo are 
presently being used in a multiplicity of applications in which robots 
interact with humans (Metz 2017a). 
52 The fact that this kind of processing is called reading can be 
traced back to the debate around the distinction between close read-
ing and distant reading, as originated by Moretti (2005).
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cess enormous numbers of texts differently from what a 
human reader would do even in the unlikely case that he 
or she could read them all, searching for patterns and cor-
relations independent of interpretation (Moretti 2005: 10).
Does this mean that we are moving towards a state of 
widespread intelligence where there will be no difference 
between algorithms and people, between “intelligent” ob-
jects and minds involved in communication? My impres-
sion is that these developments require a radical shift of 
reference from intelligence to communication. What algo-
rithms try to reproduce is not the consciousness of peo-
ple but the informativity of communication. New forms of 
communication can combine the performances of algo-
rithms with those of people, but not because algorithms 
are confused with people or because machines become 
intelligent. The working of algorithms is and becomes in-
creasingly different from that of people, but this difference 
can give rise to a new way of dealing with data and pro-
ducing differences in the communication circuit.
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